

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01  
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15  
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R 221100Z APR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6367  
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BELGRADE 3183

DEPT PASS TO NON-ALIGNED COLLECTIVE ADDRESSEES AS  
APPROPRIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PORG YO  
SUBJECT: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS - NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING  
COMMITTEE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING - KABUL

REF: STATE 097545

SUMMARY: IN COURSE OF LENGTHY CONVERSATION FSFA ASSTSEC  
(MULTI-LATERAL AFFAIRS) KOMATINA TOLD AMB THAT: GOY  
BELIEVES PANAMA CANAL AND GUAM ARE UNLIKELY TO GENERATE  
CENSORIOUS RESOLUTIONS AT THE NAM MTGS; EGYPT WILL NOT BE  
CONDEMNED FOR ITS ME INITIATIVE, NOR CUBA FOR ITS INTERVENTION  
IN THE OGADEN; ERITREA IS A MORE COMPLEX MATTER WHERE  
RADICAL AND CONSERVATIVE ARAB STATES FIND COMMON GROUND  
IN OPPOSING CUBAN/SOVIET INVOLVEMENT; NAM WILL AGAIN ADOPT  
RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING ISRAEL; AFRICAN STATES ARE PREPARED TO  
NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA; BUT NAM AS A  
WHOLE IS DEPRESSED OVER FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS  
TOWARD NIEO AND STAGNATION OF DETENTE. END SUMMARY.  
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1. DURING APRIL 20 SESSION TO REVIEW UPCOMING KABUL AND  
BELGRADE NA MEETINGS, ASST FONSEC KOMATINA MADE THE  
FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE AMBASSADOR:

2. PANAMA CANAL - KOMATINA IMMEDIATELY CONGRATULATED US  
ON RATIFICATION OF TREATIES. HE WAS ESPECIALLY LAUDATORY OF

THE BYRD AMENDMENT AS A WAY OF SOLVING THE ISSUE POSED BY THE DECONCINI RESERVATION, NOTING THAT THIS LATTER TYPE OF RESERVATION - WHICH HE TERMED A REVERSION TO GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY - SIGNIFICANTLY HARMS THE US IMAGE. HE DOES NOT EXPECT THE NAM TO CONCERN ITSELF WITH PANAMA UNLESS PANAMA IS DISSATISFIED AND WISHES TO RAISE THE CANAL ISSUE. THE GOY IS AT PRESENT INSTRUCTING ITS AMBASSADOR IN PANAMA TO ASCERTAIN THE GOP'S VIEWS. WERE THE CUBANS TO BRING THE MATTER UP ON THEIR OWN, THEY WOULD FIND LITTLE SUPPORT.

3. GUAM - WITH EXCEPTION OF INDIA AND VIETNAM, MOST NAM COUNTRIES ARE DISINTERESTED. KOMATINA NOTED THAT INDIA TOOK A GREAT INTEREST IN THE MATTER - TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE US - WHICH HE FOUND CURIOUS.

4. HUMAN RIGHTS - WILL PROBABLY NOT BE DISCUSSED AT KABUL, THOUGH IT WILL BE MENTIONED. GOY WILL PREPARE PAPER ON THE SUBJECT FOR BELGRADE CONFERENCE. THE PROBLEM EXISTS AND MUST NOT BE AVOIDED. YUGOSLAV APPROACH IS AS OUTLINED IN THE TITO-RESTON INTERVIEW; HUMAN RIGHTS MUST BE TAKEN AS A COMPLEX OF FACTORS INCLUDING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS. THIS INVOLVES, AS WELL, "THE RIGHT AGAINST FOREIGN INTERVENTION." THE GOY WILL URGE "SOMETHING SUBSTANTIAL" ON INTERVENTION, TO PUT THE ISSUE IN THE FOREGROUND AND GIVE CONFIDENTIAL

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IMPETUS TO THE UN IN DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM. KOMATINA ADDED THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD LIKE TO SEE A SPECIAL DOCUMENT TO GUARANTEE AGAINST INTERVENTION BY LARGE OR SMALL POWERS.

5. STATE OF NAM - NAM IS "DEMORALIZED" AT PRESENT, NOT ONLY BY CONFLICTS BETWEEN MEMBERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HORN OF AFRICA, AND WESTERN SAHARA, BUT ALSO BY A LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A NIEO AND THE DECELERATION OF DETENTE. "MANY" NO LONGER BELIEVE IN THE USEFULNESS OF NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY ON THE NIEO. THE PROBLEM FACING BOTH THE NAM AND THE DEVELOPED NATIONS IS HOW TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS BACK ON TRACK. THERE IS A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DETENTE AND EVENTS AROUND THE WORLD. "MANY" ARE AFRAID OF DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD NEUTRALIZE WHATEVER IMPROVEMENT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN CONSTRUCTIVE GLOBAL INVOLVEMENTS IN WORLD AFFAIRS. YUGOSLAV FONSEC MINIC IS ATTENDING THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON NAMIBIA IN LARGE PART TO SPEAK TO AS MANY NA FOREIGN MINISTERS AS POSSIBLE ON NA PROBLEMS.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED NON-ALIGNED COLLECTIVE ADDRESSEES.

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SAB-02 HA-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00 COME-00 /137 W  
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R 221100Z APR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
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INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
AMEMBASSY MADRID

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BELGRADE 3183

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6. MIDDLE EAST - ARAB UNITY HAS NEVER BEEN IN WORSE SHAPE.  
THIS IS TRUE NOT ONLY WITH REFERENCE TO WHAT CAN BE DONE TO  
BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION, BUT ALSO ON WHAT THE SOLUTION  
SHOULD BE. THE "REJECTIONISTS" DO NOT HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE  
TO OFFER. SADAT'S INITIATIVE, UNLESS HE INTENDS A SEPARATE  
PEACE ("WHICH WOULD BE A DISASTER"), HAS NO CHANCE OF  
SUCCEEDING WHILE BEGIN IS PRIME MINISTER. THE NAM FINDS ITSELF IN  
A DILEMMA. EARLIER IN LIMA, FOR EXAMPLE, RADICAL ARABS WERE  
TOLD THAT PURSUIT OF THEIR POSITIONS WOULD PARALYZE THE  
NAM ON A MARGINAL ISSUE AND HAMPER NEGOTIATIONS. OTHER NAM  
COUNTRIES TOLD THEM TO HAVE PATIENCE AND THAT THE NAM  
WOULD DEAL WITH THIS IN DUE TIME. NOW, WITH BEGIN SAYING  
"NOT THIS, NOT THAT" HOW CAN IT WAIT? THERE IS  
INSTRANSIGENCE ON BOTH SIDES WITH EGYPT AND USG IN THE  
MIDDLE. HOWEVER, NOBODY BELIEVES THAT THE US CANNOT  
SUCCEED IN ACHIEVING A SOLUTION IF IT SO WISHES-- NOT  
BY FORCE, BUT "PERHAPS BY BEING LESS DIPLOMATIC IN ITS  
DIPLOMACY". GOY DOES NOT BELIEVE THE INTER-ARAB DISPUTE  
WILL GO SO FAR AS TO PRODUCE NAM RESOLUTIONS HARMFUL TO  
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THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE ME.  
THE EGYPTIANS ARE NOW TAKING THE KABUL MEETING SERIOUSLY.  
GOY HAS ENCOURAGED THE JORDANIANS TO SEND A HIGH LEVEL  
DELEGATION, BECAUSE IT DOESN'T WANT ONLY REJECTIONISTS TO BE  
PRESENT. THE GOY WILL NOT FAVOR ANY STAND ON THE SADAT  
INITIATIVE, NOR WILL AFGHANISTAN, INDIA, OR GUYANA. 5#343  
LITTLE CHANCE FOR CONDEMNATION OF EGYPT SINCE THERE  
IS ALMOST SURELY NO CONSENSUS ON THIS MATTER. NAM USUALLY  
AGREES WITH THE RESOLUTIONS PROPOSED REGIONALLY, BUT SUDAN  
WILL NOT AGREE TO A CONDEMNATION AND GOY HAS CONVINCED THE  
IRAQIS THAT IT IS BETTER NOT TO DISCUSS ARAB PROBLEMS IN  
PUBLIC CONFERENCES. AN ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION WILL STICK TO  
A FEW PRARAGRAPHS CRITICIZING ISRAEL WITH SOMETHING ON LEBANON  
A CERTAINTY.

7. HORN OF AFRICA - ERITREA BOTHERS MANY CONSCIENCES  
WHETHER ONE BELIEVES IN ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. ONE MUST  
BEAR IN MIND THE AGONY OF A PEOPLE WHO ONCE HAD A STATUS WHICH  
SUBSEQUENTLY WAS LOST AND WHO NOW SEEK INDEPENDENCE. THE ARABS,  
HOWEVER, SEE THE ISSUE OF ERITREA AS SOLVABLE ONLY BY  
SECESSION. IN THE OGADEN, SOMALIA STILL INSISTS ON THE  
PROVISIONAL NATURE OF THE BORDER. THIS GIVES THE CUBANS  
A LEGAL STATUS WHICH WOULD DISAPPEAR IF THEY PARTICIPATED  
MILITARILY IN ERITREA. PERSONALLY, KOMATINA ADDED, HE THINKS  
THEY WILL - AT LEAST TO THE EXTENT OF PROVIDING  
SUPPORT IN THE WAR ZONES. THE PROBLEM ON THE HORN WILL NOTE  
BE PASSED OVER AT KABUL. THERE IS A WIDE VARIETY OF COUNTRIES ON  
THE NACC, BOTH AFRICAN AND ARAB. ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA - WHO  
ARE NOT MEMBERS - WILL COME. ETHIOPIA WILL COMPLAIN ABOUT  
ARAB INTERVENTION. KENYA WILL SUPPORT THEM.  
TANZANIA WILL DESIRE TO AVOID DIVERTING ATTENTION FROM THE  
PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. IT WILL BE INTERESTING  
ANY IMPORTANT TO SEE WHAT THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL SAYS, WHERE THE  
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CUBANS HAVE NO SUPPORTERS EXCEPT PERHAPS ALGERIA AND SOUTH  
YEMEN. QHADAFI IS UNPREDICTABLE, BUT HE IS PROBABLY AGAINST  
CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ERITREA. THE IRAQIS ARE "HARD". THEY HAVE  
TOLD THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS THAT IF THEY INTERVENE IN  
ERITREA THEY WILL HAVE TROUBLE WITH PROGRESSIVE ARAB  
STATES AS WELL AS CONSERVATIVE. THE AFRICAN STATES FEEL THAT A  
STATE HAS A RIGHT TO REQUEST FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO PRESERVE  
ITSELF. THIS IS WHY NO CONSENSUS COULD BE FOUND TO CONDEMN  
THE FRENCH IN WEST SAHARA. MANY NA'S FEEL THAT THE CUBANS ARE  
DOING FOR THEM WHAT THEY THEMSELVES WOULD NOT, OR COULD NOT  
DO. A FURTHER PROBLEM EXISTS IN CONDEMNING CUBA BUT NOT  
SAUDI ARABIA, SINCE ALL KNOW THAT THE SAUDIS ARE DEEPLY  
INVOLVED. THE NAM WORKS ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS BUT NO  
CONSENSUS EXISTS TO CONDEMN CUBA. WHEN IT COMES TO PUBLIC  
POSITIONS, EVEN ARABS SHOW RESTRAINT, BUT IF ERITREA COMES

UP ON THE AGENDA NO ARAB COUNTRY WILL BE ABLE TO REMAIN SILENT. YUGOSLAVIA IS THE COUNTRY MOST CONCERNED WITH HOW THE PROBLEM WILL APPEAR IDEOLOGICALLY. THE USUAL FORMULAS OF NO "FOREIGN INTERVENTION", "OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE", "THE RIGHT TO DEVELOP FREELY", AND "TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" MAY NOT SUFFICE. KOMATINA ADDED THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING, IF THERE IS TIME, LAUNCHING (NOT IN KABUL) THE IDEA OF "ZONES OF SECURITY", FREE OF ALL FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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R 221100Z APR 78  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BELGRADE 3183

DEPT PASS TO NON-ALIGNED COLLECTIVE ADDRESSEES AS  
APPROPRIATE

8. WESTERN SAHARA - THERE ARE THREE BASIC APPROACHES:

(A) THOSE RECOGNIZING THE SAHARAN PEOPLES RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION; (B) THOSE FEELING THAT THE PROBLEM IS SETTLED; AND (C) A SMALL GROUP WHO RECOGNIZE POLISARIO AS THE ONLY LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA. ENTIRE PROBLEM CAN ALSO BE TREATED AS ONE OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION BECAUSE OF THE FRENCH PRESENCE. GOY HAS NOT RECOGNIZED POLISARIO NOR THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. IT REALLY DOES NOT CARE WHAT HAPPENS IF THE LEGALITIES ARE RESPECTED.

9. NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA- WESTERN FORTHCOMINGNESS HERE IS A POTENTIAL BRIGHT SPOT IN AN OTHERWISE GLOOMY PICTURE.

THE PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION APPEAR PROMISING. AFRICAEIS  
OBVIOUSLY PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL AND IS NEGOTIATION-MINDED.  
DURING MOJSOV'S VISIT FEW RESERVATIONS WERE EXPRESSED  
AGAINST THE WESTERN PLANS. EVEN ANGOLA WAS NOT OPPOSED  
AS SUCH, JUST DISTRUSTFUL. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF THE  
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US COULD BRIEF THE AFRICAN STATES ON THE STATUS OF THESE  
NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE NAM MEETINGS.

10. CANARY ISLANDS - AFRICAN COUNTRIES SUFFER FROM AN  
OBSESSION WITH COLONIALISM. THIS IS A DISAPPEARING  
PHENOMENON BUT THE AFRICANS ARE NOT YET OUT OF THEIR SMALL  
FRAMEWORK. CANARIES ARE A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THIS. VERY FEW  
AFRICAN COUNTRIES ARE REALLY FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE  
CANARIES BUT NOT ONE IS WILLING TO SAY THIS PUBLICLY.  
EAGLEBURGER

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## Message Attributes

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**TAGS:** PORG, YO, PN  
**To:** STATE  
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